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the scope of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act via agency
rulemaking. In the Order, Trump calls for the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) to “interpret” Section 230 in a manner that curtails
websites’ ability to remove and restrict user speech. This Essay analyzes the
Order and concludes that the President’s effort to limit Section 230 will fail.
First, the FCC does not have rulemaking authority to issue the proposed
rules. Second, the proposed rules cannot be issued because they are
inconsistent with the statute. Finally, this Essay will discuss the policy
implications of the proposed rules and argue that they would lead to less
speech and engagement on the Internet, not more of it.
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INTRODUCTION
It was years in the making, but on May 26, 2020, Twitter finally1 took
action on the account of @realDonaldTrump.2 As content moderation goes,
the action was fairly modest. Twitter appended the following to a tweet
making misleading claims about mail-in voting: “Get the facts about mail-in
ballots”3 and a link to accurate voting information.4 The President’s response
was swift and retributive. Within hours, he tweeted that Twitter is “now
interfering in the 2020 Presidential Election” and “completely stifling FREE

1

Elizabeth Dwoskin, Twitter’s Decision to Label Trump’s Tweets Was Two Years in the Making,
WASH. POST (May 29, 2020, 6:55 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/05/29/insidetwitter-trump-label/ [https://perma.cc/6FWD-HR5D].
2
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump (last
visited Oct. 26, 2020).
3
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 26, 2020, 7:17 AM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1265255845358645254 [https://perma.cc/9DRW-2L7N].
4
See Trump Makes Unsubstantiated Claim That Mail-In Ballots Will Lead to Voter Fraud, TWITTER
(May 26, 2020), https://twitter.com/i/events/1265330601034256384 [https://perma.cc/NC44-2P9B].
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SPEECH.”5 And within two days, he signed Executive Order 13,925, titled
“Preventing Online Censorship,”6 a proclamation that seeks to punish large
social media platforms that have the temerity to fact-check the President.7
The Executive Order represents an effort to undermine the immunity
that platforms like Twitter and Facebook enjoy under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (CDA) when it comes to moderating user
content8—Section 230 grants broad immunity to websites with respect to
decisions they make about publishing and removing user content.9 The
Executive Order directs the Commerce Department to file a rulemaking
petition before the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to “clarify”
the existing immunity, by which the Order really means to rewrite the statute
in the guise of making it clearer.10
As explained in this Essay, this convoluted attempt to bypass Congress
will not succeed. Yet, it would be a mistake to ignore the Order as it comes
at a time when there is vigorous public debate over the scope of Section 230
and platforms’ social responsibilities in general.11 There are essentially two
debates about Section 230 occurring simultaneously and at cross purposes:
conservatives see liberal bias against conservative speech and seek to
constrain service providers’ discretion in removing content, while the other
side of the aisle sees too little action over hate speech, fake news, and other
problematic content and seeks obligations to remove such content.12 As
Internet law scholar Professor Eric Goldman puts it, “Section 230 is a magnet

5
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 26, 2020, 6:40 PM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1265427538140188676 [https://perma.cc/V2MF-DFBL].
6
Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (June 2, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
presidential-actions/executive-order-preventing-online-censorship/ [https://perma.cc/EY88-EGAK].
7
For this reason, one organization has challenged the Order on First Amendment grounds. See
Complaint at ¶¶ 9–12, Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Trump, No. 20-1456 (D.D.C. June 2, 2020).
8
See Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 at 34,080–81.
9
47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1), (c)(2); Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 64 (2d Cir. 2019) (citations
omitted) (“In light of Congress’s objectives, the Circuits are in general agreement that the text of Section
230(c)(1) should be construed broadly in favor of immunity.”).
10
Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 at 34,081.
11
See Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1652–57 (2018) (describing negative publicity over high-profile
content moderation incidents and pressures on platforms to moderate offensive content); see also John
Samples, Why the Government Should Not Regulate Content Moderation of Social Media, 865 POL’Y
ANALYSIS 1, 1–2 (2019) (describing criticism of platforms’ moderation decisions).
12
See PAUL M. BARRETT, REGULATING SOCIAL MEDIA: THE FIGHT OVER SECTION 230—AND
BEYOND 2–3 (2020), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b6df958f8370af3217d4178/t/5f4d682af95
6e403bdd2dcf5/1598908459863/NYU+Section+230_FINAL+ONLINE+UPDATED_Aug+26.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MH2J-8AJZ].
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for controversy, and this order pours fuel on the fire.”13 Indeed, the Order has
spawned proposed legislation that would implement its principal proposed
limitations on the scope of Section 230.14
Part I of this Essay reviews the genesis of Section 230 and the immunity
it confers. Part II then discusses the Executive Order’s proposed rules and
analyzes whether the FCC has the authority to promulgate rules under
Section 230, concluding that it does not. The Executive Order seeks to
constrain websites’ discretion to remove content by requiring them to
provide users with certain aspects of procedural due process, such as notice,
reasoned decisions, and the opportunity to be heard.15 Yet, nothing in the
FCC’s authorizing statute, the Communications Act of 1934,16 expressly
grants the FCC authority to regulate Internet content, and Section 230 gives
the FCC no role to play. While there are some additional potential sources
of authority available, the FCC, currently led by Trump appointees, has
closed off these avenues.
Part III examines whether the FCC could issue the Executive Order’s
proposed rules even if it had authority. It concludes that the FCC cannot
because there is no ambiguity in the statute permitting the proposed
interpretations, and, moreover, the interpretations are inconsistent with the
text of Section 230.
Lastly, Part IV reviews the policy implications of the proposed due
process rules on content moderation. It concludes that instead of increasing
free speech, the rules will have the opposite effect and will lead to more
unwanted speech and less civil engagement online.

13

Peter Baker & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Trumpʼs Order on Social Media Could Harm One Person
in Particular: Donald Trump, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05
/28/us/politics/trump-jack-dorsey.html [https://perma.cc/Y5DU-VFGK] (quoting Professor Eric
Goldman).
14
On September 8, 2020, Senators Roger Wicker (R-MS), Lindsay Graham (R-SC), and Marsha
Blackburn (R-TN) introduced a bill titled the Online Freedom and Viewpoint Diversity Act. A copy of
the bill, unnumbered as of this date, is available at https://www.commerce.senate.gov
/services/files/94D0F3C6-B927-46D2-A75C-17C78D0D92AA [https://perma.cc/8F28-VSYK]. The bill
adopts a number of the Executive Order’s proposals. And before the Executive Order, Senators Brian
Schatz (D-HI) and John Thune (R-SD) introduced the also unnumbered Platform Accountability and
Consumer
Transparency
Act,
https://www.schatz.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/OLL20612.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8ZNV-5KFH], which would, among other things, require service providers to give users
the right to appeal decisions by the service providers to remove their content.
15
Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 at 34,081.
16
Codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151.
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I.

SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT

Passed as the Cox-Wyden Amendment to the Telecommunications Act
of 1996,17 Section 230 of the CDA18 is often cited as the most important piece
of legislation governing the Internet as it gives websites and other online
services freedom to make vast quantities of user content available without
worrying that any single piece of content might be tortious or illegal.19 The
central idea behind the statute is that websites should not be held liable for
the decisions they make as to whether to publish or withdraw user content,
and that they should be encouraged in their efforts to remove user content.20
Section 230 accomplishes this by providing users and service providers with
affirmative defenses21 to civil22 and certain criminal liability23 under state24
and federal laws.25
A. The Genesis of Section 230
Section 230 was passed in response to a pair of trial court decisions in
the mid-1990s that gave members of Congress pause.26 The first case, Cubby,
17

Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137–39 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230). Title V of
the Act is called the Communications Decency Act.
18
47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018).
19
As explained by preeminent First Amendment scholar and Internet policy expert Marvin Ammori,
Section 230 does for online publishers what New York Times Co. v. Sullivan did for print newspapers.
Marvin Ammori, The “New” New York Times: Free Speech Lawyering in the Age of Google and Twitter,
127 HARV. L. REV. 2259, 2263–64 (2014). In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held
that First Amendment principles required that the tort of defamation be altered such that when the plaintiff
is a public figure, the plaintiff must prove “actual malice.” 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). This gives
speakers, including newspapers and other publishers, more freedom to report upon and criticize public
figures. Ammori argues that Section 230 provides online services with similar breathing room. Ammori,
supra, at 2263–64.
20
See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1170–71 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (explaining that “section 230 was meant to provide immunity [such
that] any activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek
to post online is perforce immune under section 230”).
21
See Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
22
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (heading referring to “civil liability”).
23
All inconsistent state laws are expressly preempted. Id. § 230(e)(3). Federal criminal laws are
specifically excluded from Section 230’s ambit. Id. § 230(e)(1); see also Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC,
No. 17-11069, 2018 WL 1542056, at *2 (D. Mass. Mar. 29, 2018) (explaining that Section 230 “creat[es]
immunity from civil and state criminal law, but not federal criminal law”). Following a 2018 amendment,
Congress carved out state criminal prosecutions for sex trafficking and prostitution. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(e)(5)(B)–(C).
24
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).
25
For example, Section 230 applies to later-enacted federal laws. See Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC,
817 F.3d 12, 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2016) (finding that Section 230(e)(1) precluded civil liability under
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008), abrogated by statute, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(e)(5).
26
141 CONG. REC. H8469–70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
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Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., concluded that CompuServe, an early online
service, could not be held liable for defamation based upon user content
unless it had actual notice of defamation.27 The court reasoned that
CompuServe resembled a “distributor” under common law tort principles
akin to a bookstore or newsstand because it did not screen user content.28 Just
as newsstands and bookstores are not liable for selling defamatory
newspapers and books (unless they have reason to know about the
defamatory statements), nor should CompuServe be liable for the user’s
defamation.29 The second case, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services
Co., involved Prodigy, a provider that screened for content unsuitable for
children.30 Having undertaken screening efforts, the court ruled that Prodigy
should be treated as a publisher—like a news editor—rather than a
distributor, and thus should face liability for defamatory user content, even
in the absence of notice or actual knowledge.31
Congress recognized that this liability regime would, perversely,
penalize good Samaritans like the family-friendly Prodigy.32 As Professor
Goldman explains, Stratton Oakmont created the “moderator’s dilemma”:
service providers must choose between aggressively removing content or
curtailing moderation activities so that they do not put themselves on notice
of potential illegality.33 Both options are unpalatable: the former reduces
speech while the latter results in the proliferation of unsuitable content
online.34
To remove the disincentives for self-regulation, Section 230 overrules
Stratton Oakmont, immunizing website operators with respect to certain

27

776 F. Supp. 135, 140–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Under New York law, for example, “vendors and
distributors of defamatory publications are not liable if they neither know nor have reason to know of the
defamation.” Id. at 139 (quoting Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 235 (S.D.N.Y.
1981)).
28
Id. at 140–41.
29
This common law rule is “deeply rooted in the First Amendment” concern that if a bookseller had
to make himself aware of the contents of every book in his shop, such an unreasonable burden would
“become the public’s burden, for by restricting him the public’s access to reading matter would be
restricted.” Id. at 139–40 (quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959)).
30
No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *4–5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
31
Id.
32
141 CONG. REC. H8469–70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) (describing the
outcomes of Stratton Oakmont as “backward” in the context of Cubby, Inc.); see also FTC v. LeadClick
Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 173 (2d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “[t]he [CDA] was intended to overrule
Stratton [Oakmont] and provide immunity for ‘interactive computer service[s]’ that make ‘good faith’
efforts to block and screen offensive content”).
33
Eric Goldman, An Overview of the United States’ Section 230 Internet Immunity, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF ONLINE INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY 3 (Giancarlo Frosio ed., 2020).
34
See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
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decisions they make concerning user-generated content.35 Under the heading
“Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive
material,”36 Section 230(c) immunizes service providers from (1) actions
undertaken as a publisher;37 and (2) good faith efforts to remove or restrict
offensive content.38 Subject to certain exemptions (such as federal criminal
prosecutions and intellectual property laws),39 these immunities modify other
federal laws40 and preempt inconsistent state laws.41 It thus acts as a type of
“super statute.”42
Congress also took the “rather unusual step”43 of announcing its policy
objectives in Section 230(b), which states that Congress’s objectives are to,
inter alia, “preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently
exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State regulation;”44 “encourage the development of technologies
[that] maximize user control” about what individuals, families, and schools
see;45 and “remove disincentives for the development and utilization of
blocking and filtering technologies [to] empower parents to restrict their
children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material.”46
B. Judicial Interpretation of Section 230
Guided by Congress’s express goals, courts have established a robust
body of law interpreting Section 230 broadly in favor of immunity for

35

47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2018).
Id.
37
Id. § 230(c)(1).
38
Id. § 230(c)(2)(A).
39
Id. § 230(e)(1), (2), (4).
40
See Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 71–72 (2d Cir. 2019) (applying Section 230 to civil
claim under federal anti-terrorism law).
41
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).
42
See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020) (describing the federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Act as a “super statute” because it “displac[es] the normal operation of other federal
laws”).
43
Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, Inc., 946 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2019),
cert. denied, No. 19-1284, 2020 WL 6067214, at *1 (Oct. 13, 2020). Legislative statements by Section
230’s sponsors indicate that this statement of policy was intended to ward off federal regulation of Internet
content. See 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) (“[I]t will establish
as the policy of the United States that we do not wish to have content regulation by the Federal
Government of what is on the Internet . . . .”).
44
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).
45
Id. § 230(b)(3).
46
Id. § 230(b)(4).
36
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websites and other online services that host user content.47 Although the
Supreme Court has reviewed unrelated provisions of the CDA,48 it has not
yet reviewed a case involving Section 230.49 As such, this Essay will briefly
review some of the key lower court decisions.
The “typical” Section 230 case involves a situation where a service
provider has published allegedly illegal user content.50 A smaller, but
increasingly litigated, category involves challenges of content removal
decisions.51 Service providers have generally been successful in suppressing
both categories of claims based upon Section 230(c)(1), which states that
service providers shall not be considered publishers or speakers of content
posted by others.52 In addition to this provision, Section 230(c)(2) provides
for immunity for service providers who voluntarily remove or restrict access
to certain types of objectionable content,53 and thus more directly addresses
the act of content removal.54
1. Section 230(c)(1)
Section 230(c)(1) states that no service provider “shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.”55 No discussion of this language is complete without
mentioning the Fourth Circuit’s 1997 decision in Zeran v. American
Online.56 There, a defamation plaintiff asserted that Section 230 did not bar
his claims because the service provider had notice of the defamatory user
content.57 In his view, Congress, by using the term “publisher” in Section
47
Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 64 (2d Cir. 2019) (“In light of Congress’s objectives, the
Circuits are in general agreement that the text of Section 230(c)(1) should be construed broadly in favor
of immunity.”).
48
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849, 882 (1997) (striking down on First Amendment grounds antiindecency provisions of the Communications Decency Act, previously codified as 47 U.S.C. § 223).
49
Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, No. 19-1284, 2020 WL 6067214, at *1
(Oct. 13, 2020) (explaining that “in the 24 years since [its passage], we have never interpreted this
provision”) (Thomas, J., in respect of denial of certiorari). Justice Thomas recently questioned lower
courts’ broad interpretations of Section 230, see id., and suggested that, “in an appropriate case, we should
consider whether the text of this increasingly important statute aligns with the current state of immunity
enjoyed by Internet platforms.” Id.
50
Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 592, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“In the typical case, plaintiffs
seek to hold the interactive computer service liable for publishing the content of a third party . . . and
immunity from liability under (c)(1) is found in that context.”).
51
See id.
52
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
53
Id. § 230(c)(2).
54
Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 64 n.16 (2d Cir. 2019) (observing that Section 230(c)(2)
“responds to Stratton [Oakmont] even more directly”).
55
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
56
129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997).
57
Id. at 329, 331.

199

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

230(c)(1), meant only to abrogate Stratton Oakmont, while preserving the
“distributor,” or notice-based, liability as set forth in Cubby.58
The Fourth Circuit rejected this approach, finding that notice-based
liability would, like Stratton Oakmont itself, “reinforce[] service providers’
incentives to restrict speech [or] abstain from self-regulation.”59 First, the
court reasoned that requiring “on-the-spot editorial decision[s]” upon notice
would not be feasible given “the sheer number of postings on interactive
computer services.”60 And because providers would face liability only for
content they did not remove, there would be “a natural incentive simply to
remove messages upon notification, whether the contents were defamatory
or not,” thus chilling speech.61 Second, some providers would actively avoid
moderation activities because “efforts by a service provider to investigate
and screen material posted on its service would only lead to notice of
potentially defamatory material more frequently and thereby create a
stronger basis for liability.”62
Today, federal and state courts63 agree that Section 230(c)(1) applies
whenever three things are true: (1) the defendant provides an “interactive
computer service;” (2) the defendant did not create the “information content”
at issue; and (3) the plaintiff’s claims “seek[] to hold a service provider liable
for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as
deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content.”64 Put
another way, “any activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to
exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune
under section 230.”65
Early Section 230 cases involved plaintiffs asserting claims of
defamation against service providers based upon libelous user postings.66
58

Id. at 331–32.
Id. at 333.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
See, e.g., Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 64 (2d Cir. 2019) (“In light of Congress’s
objectives, the Circuits are in general agreement that the text of Section 230(c)(1) should be construed
broadly in favor of immunity.”); Shiamili v. Real Est. Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1016(N.Y.
2011) (explaining that “[b]oth state and federal courts around the country have ‘generally interpreted
Section 230 immunity broadly’”); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 513 (Cal. 2006) (“These provisions
have been widely and consistently interpreted to confer broad immunity against defamation liability for
those who use the Internet to publish information that originated from another source.”).
64
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; see also, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d
398, 407–09 (6th Cir. 2014) (adopting Zeran formulation); FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158,
174 (2d Cir. 2016) (applying Zeran framework).
65
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170–71
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
66
See, e.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
59
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Subsequent cases have extended Section 230 beyond defamation to claims
ranging from negligence resulting in offline harm67 to civil causes of action
under federal anti-terrorism laws.68
Section 230(c)(1) is not, however, without limitation. By its terms, the
statute does not apply to content created by the website itself.69 Thus, a
service provider’s own speech online is never immune from liability.70 Nor
can a provider avoid liability where it contributed materially to the illegality
of the challenged content.71 Finally, Section 230(c)(1) does not apply where
liability stems from a website’s act that is independent of its publishing
choices.72
2. Section 230(c)(2)
Section 230(c)(2) contains two parts. Section 230(c)(2)(A) states that
no service provider shall be liable for “any action voluntarily taken in good
faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected.”73 This immunity applies when the defendant: (1)
removed or restricted access to online materials; (2) acted in good faith; and
(3) considered the materials to fall into one of the covered categories.
Although this first part of this provision more directly responds to
Stratton Oakmont and Congress’s concerns about disincentives to remove
content,74 it has been less frequently litigated.75 And much of that litigation
has focused on the scope of the catch-all term “otherwise objectionable.”76
Some district courts have held that the term is not completely open-ended
and must bear some relationship with the enumerated terms under the canon

67

See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 413 (5th Cir. 2008).
See Force, 934 F.3d at 53.
69
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (“None of this means, of course, that the original culpable party who posts
defamatory messages would escape accountability.”).
70
See id. at 330–31.
71
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170–71
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
72
See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009).
73
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
74
Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 80 (2d Cir. 2019) (Katzmann, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
75
Eric Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better than the First Amendment, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
REFLECTION 33, 40 (2019).
76
See Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, Inc., 946 F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2019)
(observing that “[d]istrict courts nationwide have grappled with the issues” presented by this term), cert.
denied, No. 19-1284, 2020 WL 6067214, at *1 (Oct. 13, 2020).
68
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ejusdem generis,77 the principle that “when a general term follows a specific
one, the general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to
the one with specific enumeration.”78 The only appellate decision on this
score has rejected that view. In Enigma Software v. Malwarebytes, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that ejusdem generis supplied little assistance because the
enumerated categories lacked commonality, explaining that “[m]aterial that
is lewd or lascivious is not necessarily similar to material that is violent, or
material that is harassing.”79 Accordingly, because the enumerated terms
“vary greatly . . . the catchall was more likely intended to encapsulate forms
of unwanted online content that Congress could not identify in the 1990s.”80
The second part of this provision, 230(c)(2)(B), is an immunity that
allows “any action taken to enable or make available to information content
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material
described in” the first paragraph (i.e., the enumerated categories and
“otherwise objectionable” content).81 This immunity allows users and service
providers to develop tools that allow others to restrict and remove materials,
such as a tool that allows users to block or limit other users from commenting
on their pages.82
3. Application to Users
Section 230(c)’s immunities do not just protect large social media
platforms, they also protect “users” and any “providers” of interactive
computer services.83 While Section 230(c)(1) certainly immunizes Twitter
from liability for a user’s defamatory tweet, it also protects the individuals
who retweet it.84 Thus, although President Trump may be upset about
Twitter’s action as it relates to his mail-in-vote tweet85 (an action that is,
77
See, e.g., Song Fi Inc. v. Google, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 876, 883 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Holomaxx Tech.
v. Microsoft Corp., 783 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1104–05 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
78
Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 223 (2008) (quoting Norfolk & Western R. Co. v.
Am. Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991)).
79
946 F.3d at 1051.
80
Id. at 1051–52.
81
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). Technically, this provision ends with the words, “the material described in
paragraph (1).” Id. Since there is no “paragraph (1),” this is a “typographical error,” as recognized by the
United States Code Annotated. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c)(2)(B) (West 2018).
82
Fehrenbach v. Zeldin, No. 17-CV-5282, 2018 WL 4242452, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2018)
(finding that section 230(c)(2)(B) precluded a lawsuit that “charges the Facebook defendants with
enabling users to restrict access to material”).
83
47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1), (2).
84
See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 528–29 (2006) (concluding that “user” includes a user who
knowingly republishes a defamatory post of another).
85
See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. Twitter’s fact-check label would not be protected by
Section 230 because it is “information content” created or developed by Twitter itself, not of “another
information content provider.” Id.
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ironically, not protected by Section 230), he enjoys Section 230 protection
anytime he retweets content that may contain defamatory statements.86
Indeed, part of what makes Section 230 so controversial is that this immunity
applies even where the retweeting individual does so with knowledge that
the content is defamatory since there is no good faith requirement in Section
230(c)(1).87
Section 230(c)(2) also protects each user’s ability to block other users
from reading and participating in their feeds.88 This allows people to use their
favorite social media apps without being subjected to harassment. Twitter
recently launched a tool that allows people to determine who may reply to
their tweets.89 Indeed, before being ordered not to do so based upon the First
Amendment, President Trump routinely blocked “persons expressing
viewpoints he [found] distasteful” from his Twitter feed.90 After President
Trump returns to the private sector, he will presumably want to resume
blocking individuals, an action protected by Section 230(c)(2).
4. Litigation of the Immunities in Practice
Because the Section 230 immunities are affirmative defenses to
liability,91 the defendant service provider bears the burden of proof.92 Still,
Section 230 cases can be decided on motions to dismiss when the defense is
evident from the complaint.93 Because defendants do not need to prove any
particular state of mind or that they took any affirmative steps, the Section
230(c)(1) immunity typically presents a question of law that can be resolved
on a motion to dismiss,94 thus “provid[ing] . . . legal certainty at a relatively
low cost.”95
86

Baker & Wakabayashi, supra note 13.
See Barrett, 146 P.3d at 529 (“The prospect of blanket immunity for those who intentionally
redistribute defamatory statements on the Internet has disturbing implications”).
88
For an overview of Twitter functionality in a First Amendment context, see Knight First Am. Inst.
v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 230–31 (2d Cir. 2019).
89
Aja Romano, Twitter Now Lets You Disable Replies. It Could Be Its Best Change Yet., VOX (May
27, 2020, 2:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/5/27/21265271/twitter-moderate-turn-off-repliesfeature [https://perma.cc/L4RJ-XTHY] (explaining that the “tool won’t completely wipe out Twitter
harassment, but it may drastically reduce it”).
90
Knight First Am. Inst., 928 F.3d at 239. The court found that Trump’s Twitter feed was a public
forum claim under the First Amendment. Id. at 238.
91
See Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
92
See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab’y, 554 U.S. 84, 91 (2008) (discussing affirmative
defenses to find that “[w]hen a proviso . . . carves an exception out of the body of a statute or contract
those who set up such exception must prove it”) (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Javierre v.
Cent. Altagracia, 217 U.S. 502, 508 (1910)).
93
Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1357.
94
See Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 63 n.15 (2d Cir. 2019).
95
Goldman, supra note 75, at 42.
87
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Because it contains a mental element (good faith),96 Section 230(c)(2)
may make somewhat of a less attractive case for a motion to dismiss as it
could require discovery and even a trial where there is a genuine dispute over
the defendant’s state of mind. For this reason, Professor Goldman suspects
that Section 230(c)(2) imposes “higher litigation burdens [which] discourage
defendants from relying upon it.”97 Still, Section 230(c)(2) has been applied
on motions to dismiss98 and so it is not necessarily clear whether this is
empirically the case.
II.

THE FCC LACKS AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN THE PROPOSED
RULEMAKING

The FCC has many regulatory powers over interstate communications,99
but the ability to regulate Internet content is not one of them. In addition,
under the Trump Administration, the FCC has largely forsworn potential
sources of authority that could be marshaled here. Thus, at present, it is
unlikely that the FCC will be able to issue the Executive Order’s proposed
rules.
A. Proposed Rules Under the Executive Order and NTIA Petition
Executive Order 13,925, initially drafted in August 2019,100 asserts that
“[o]nline platforms are engaging in selective censorship that is harming our
national discourse” by flagging content as inappropriate, making
unexplained policy changes, and deleting content and entire accounts
without warning, rationale, or recourse.101 The Order identifies Section 230
as the culprit enabling this “censorship” and argues that the statute should be
“clarified” in several respects.102
The Order directs the Secretary of Commerce to cause the National
Telecommunications Information Administration (NTIA) to file a petition
for rulemaking with the FCC within 60 days103 to “expeditiously propose
regulations to clarify” that: (1) Section 230(c)(1) does not apply to the
96

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
Goldman, supra note 75, at 40.
98
See, e.g., Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 592, 599, 603–04 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (dismissing
case under Section 230(c)(2)).
99
See 47 U.S.C. § 303 (setting forth express powers of the FCC).
100
Margaret Harding McGill & Daniel Lippman, White House Drafting Executive Order to Tackle
Silicon Valley’s Alleged Anti-Conservative Bias, POLITICO (Aug. 7, 2019, 3:07 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/07/white-house-tech-censorship-1639051 [https://perma.cc/2D
Q9-8CRP].
101
Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079, 34,079 (June 2, 2020).
102
Id. at 34,080.
103
Id. at 34,081.
97
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removal of content; and (2) under Section 230(c)(2), “good faith” requires
service providers to “provide adequate notice, reasoned explanation, or a
meaningful opportunity to be heard”104 before they can remove a user’s
content. The remainder of the Order advances other initiatives ostensibly
aimed at eliminating “Tech Bias,” but none involve the FCC or Section
230.105
As required by the Executive Order, NTIA filed a petition for
rulemaking with the FCC.106 The FCC has published the petition for
comment,107 and on October 15, 2020, Chairman Ajit Pai stated that “I intend
to move forward with a rulemaking to clarify [Section 230’s] meaning.”108
While Republicans currently control the FCC 3–2, it is not clear whether
they have three votes to commence a rulemaking proceeding—at least at
present. Following the Executive Order’s release, Republican Commissioner
Michael O’Rielly commented that despite harboring concerns about the
actions of “liberal tech leaders,” “I’m extremely dedicated to [the] First
Amendment which governs much here.”109 The Trump Administration
interpreted this comment as opposition: In September, it withdrew
O’Rielly’s re-nomination to the FCC and instead nominated Nathan
Simington—a senior NTIA advisor who is said to have played a significant
role in drafting NTIA’s petition—to fill O’Rielly’s seat once it is vacated.110
NTIA’s petition significantly expands upon the Executive Order’s
mandate by asking the FCC to “interpret” Section 230 in a variety of ways
that the Order did not specifically request.111 Notwithstanding this expansion,
this Essay addresses only the proposed rules that are directed towards

104

Id. The Order also asks for clarification as to whether an action can be “taken in good faith” if it
is “deceptive, pretextual, or inconsistent with a provider’s terms of service.” Id.
105
Id. at 34,081–82.
106
Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., Petition for Rulemaking, RM-11862 (July 27, 2020)
[hereinafter NTIA Pet.].
107
FCC, Public Notice, Petition for Rulemakings Filed, Report No. 3157 (Aug. 3, 2020),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-365914A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SAZ-YCWU].
108
FCC, Statement of Chairman Pai on Section 230 (Oct. 15, 2020), https://docs.fcc.gov/public
/attachments/DOC-367567A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/38DC-GFQ9].
109
Makena Kelly, Trump Nominates Social Media Hawk as Next FCC Commissioner, VERGE (Sept.
15, 2020, 9:38 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/9/15/21438820/fcc-donald-trump-nominatenathan-simington-commissioner-social-media-section-230-order [https://perma.cc/WHL9-BSJ4].
110
Id.
111
Most notably, NTIA’s proposed rules state that “[a]n interactive computer service is not being
‘treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider’
when it actually publishes its own or third-party content.” NTIA Pet., supra note 106, at 53 (proposed
47 C.F.R. § 130.01(c)). This would likely gut Section 230(c)(1) as to “publish” content is to make it
publicly available—which is what all platforms do. See Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 65 (2d Cir.
2019) (discussing meaning of “publisher”).
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constraining decisions to remove or restrict access to online content as that
was the focal point of the Executive Order.
As contemplated by the Order, NTIA’s proposed rules would preclude
the application of Section 230(c)(1) to the act of removing or restricting user
content, thus shunting those acts into Section 230(c)(2) alone.112 The
proposed regulations next seek to limit Section 230(c)(2) by (1) replacing its
subjective good faith element with one of objective reasonableness;113 (2)
removing the “otherwise objectionable” catch-all category (thus limiting the
provision’s applicability to the enumerated categories of offensive
content);114 and (3) requiring a service provider to give advance notice and
reason for removing or restricting access to user content before doing so, and
allow the impacted user a reasonable opportunity to respond.115 On the last
point, service providers need not provide advance notice (i.e., they may
remove or restrict access to materials immediately) if they have a reasonable
belief that the content is related to criminal activity or would risk imminent
physical harm.116
B.

FCC Rulemaking Authority Under the Communications Act

Created by the New Deal-era Communications Act of 1934,117 the FCC
is charged with regulating interstate and international communications by
radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.118 The Telecommunications Act
of 1996 updated the Communications Act for the Internet era. Where the
Internet is concerned, the degree of regulatory authority depends on whether

112
NTIA Pet., supra note 106, at 53 (proposed rule 47 C.F.R. § 130.01(a)) (“Section 230(c)(1) has
no application to any interactive computer service’s decision, agreement, or action to restrict access to or
availability of material provided by another information content provider . . . . Any applicable immunity
for matters described in the immediately preceding sentence shall be provided solely by 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(2).”).
113
NTIA Pet., supra note 106, at 55 (proposed rule 47 C.F.R. § 130.02(e)(vi)) (providing that good
faith requires, inter alia, “an objectively reasonable belief that the material falls within one of the listed
categories set forth in 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A)”) (emphasis added).
114
Id. (providing that good faith requires, inter alia, “an objectively reasonable belief that the
material falls within one of the listed categories set forth in 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A)”) (emphasis added).
The proposed rules would also narrowly construe the listed categories. See id. at 54–55 (proposed rule
47 C.F.R. § 130.02(a)).
115
Id. at 55 (proposed rule 47 C.F.R. § 130.02(e)(viii) (requiring “timely notice describing with
particularity the interactive computer service’s reasonable factual basis for the restriction of access and a
meaningful opportunity to respond” subject to exceptions).
116
Id. (providing exceptions where “the interactive computer service has an objectively reasonable
belief that the content is related to criminal activity or [where] notice would risk imminent physical harm
to others”).
117
Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
118
See id.; see also About the FCC, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/about/overview [https://perma.cc/M8
Y8-N4D6] (agency mission statement).
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a service is considered a “telecommunications service” (for which there is
comprehensive authority) or an “information service” (for which there is
relatively little authority),119 a distinction added by the 1996 Act. A
“‘telecommunications service’ means the offering of telecommunications for
a fee directly to the public . . . regardless of the facilities used.”120
“‘[T]elecommunications’ means the transmission, between or among points
specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change
in the form or content of the information as sent and received.”121 Basic
landline telephone service is the archetype of a telecommunications
service.122 When a system is properly categorized as a “telecommunications
service,” its operator—“a telecommunications carrier”—is subject to a
panoply of common carrier regulations123 under Title II of the
Communications Act. A common carrier is an entity that has acquired a
quasi-public character, from which arises the obligation to carry goods or
services for all people indiscriminately and on reasonable terms.124 Common
carrier regulations under Title II of Communications Act include
interconnection requirements,125 price regulation,126 and anti-discrimination
rules.127
In contrast, the FCC has no comparable mandate over “information
services,” which are services that are capable of “generating, acquiring,
storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available
information via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing.”128
Under the Communications Act, these services are “largely unregulated by
default.”129 Further, the Act limits the FCC’s ability to regulate any entity as
a common carrier except “to the extent that it is engaged in providing

119
See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (describing history and
development of the distinction between a “telecommunications service” and an “information service”).
120
47 U.S.C. § 153(53).
121
Id. § 153(50).
122
See U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 691 (observing that the FCC has “subjected basic [telephone]
services . . . to common carrier treatment under Title II of the Communications Act”).
123
Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 651–52 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (discussing common carriage generally).
124
Id. at 651 (quoting Nat’l Assoc. of Regul. Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (1976))
(“[T]he primary sine qua non of common carrier status is a quasi-public character, which arises out of the
undertaking to carry for all people indifferently.”).
125
47 U.S.C. § 201(a).
126
Id. §§ 201(b), 202(a), 205.
127
Id. § 201(b).
128
Id. § 153(24).
129
Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311, 473–74 ¶ 273 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 FCC
Order].
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telecommunications services.”130 Thus, the FCC cannot set rates or prohibit
discrimination with respect to information services.131
Notably, websites, apps, and other online services have not yet been
classified as either a telecommunications service or an information service.
It is unlikely, though, that the FCC could classify Facebook or Twitter or the
average blog as anything other than an information service.
For one thing, an “information service” expressly includes “electronic
publishing,”132 which describes the activity of every website. Even without
the “electronic publishing” example, it is a heavy lift to show that a website
could qualify as a telecommunications service. Websites do not just transmit
data from one point to another without any change whatsoever: they receive
and store user information, reformat that information, and present it in a web
interface that allows other users to interact with it. Further,
telecommunications services must be provided for “a fee directly to the
public” or to users,133 which would make its application to advertising-based
revenue models difficult.
Finally, the FCC will be constrained by its own classification of Internet
service providers (ISPs)—entities that connect users to the Internet such as
Comcast or AT&T—as information services. In repealing the Obama era
FCC’s “net neutrality” rules, the current FCC concluded that while ISPs are
primarily carriers of data, they can be considered information services
because they perform the ancillary services of domain name lookups134 and
caching (temporarily storing files for quicker access).135 A fortiori,
companies whose primary services involve the storage and manipulation of
information must also be classified as information services. Accordingly,
130

47 U.S.C. § 153(51).
Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 650–55, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (striking down net neutrality rules
as unlawful common carrier regulations). The Court in Verizon stated it was “obvious that the
Commission would violate the Communications Act were it to regulate broadband providers as common
carriers” because of the “Commission’s still-binding decision to classify broadband providers not as
providers of ‘telecommunications services’ but instead as providers of ‘information services,’ such
treatment would run afoul of section 153(51).” Id. at 650 (citation omitted).
132
47 U.S.C. § 153(24).
133
Id. § 153(53).
134
Domain Name Service (DNS) matches web page addresses that users type into their browsers
with the Internet Protocol (IP) address of the servers hosting those pages. See Nat’l Cable & Telecom.
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 987 (2005). For example, DNS translates “Amazon.com”
into “108.174.10.10,” thus making it easier for users to locate the web pages they wish to visit. In Brand
X, the dissent likened DNS to “scarcely more than routing information, which is expressly excluded from
the definition of ‘information service.’” Id. at 1012–13 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 47 U.S.C.
§ 153(20)). In reply, the majority observed that routing information was not excluded from the definition
of “information service.” Id. at 999 n.3.
135
2018 FCC Order, supra note 129, at 325 ¶ 33; Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 32–35 (D.C.
Cir. 2019) (finding FCC’s reliance on caching and DNS to justify reclassification reasonable).
131
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under the overall structure of the Communications Act, the FCC lacks the
authority to regulate websites and online applications, which are information
services.136
C. NTIA’s Attempt to Find Rulemaking Authority Under the Common
Carrier Provisions of the Communications Act
In its petition, NTIA attempts to ground rulemaking authority in the
FCC’s general authority to make common carrier provisions under Section
201(b) of the Communications Act.137 This presents a novel use of that
provision as it is ostensibly limited to making common carrier regulations,138
which, as discussed above, may only regulate telecommunications
services—and not information services like websites. Section 201(a) of the
Communications Act begins with the words, “[i]t shall be the duty of every
common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign communication by wire or
radio,”139 and Section 201(b) explains that “[a]ll charges, practices,
classifications, and regulations for and in connection with such
communication service, shall be just and reasonable.”140 After describing
additional common carrier-specific issues, Section 201(b) concludes with the
following sentence: “The Commission may prescribe such rules and
regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the
provisions of this chapter.”141 It is this sentence that NTIA relies upon to issue
its proposed Section 230 rules.
NTIA argues that Section 201(b) can and should be invoked to make
rules under Section 230 because Section 230 was codified into Chapter 5 of
Title 47 and thus falls within “this chapter” of the Act.142 That Section 230
falls within the same chapter as Section 201(b) is certainly true, but it is less
clear that the FCC can make regulations under Section 201(b) that have
nothing to do with common carriers. The Supreme Court cases that NTIA
cites143 held that Section 201(b) allows rulemaking under later-enacted
provisions (specifically, those added by the 1996 Telecommunications Act),
136

2018 FCC Order, supra note 129, at 473–74 ¶ 273.
47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (“The Commission may prescribe such rules and regulations as may be
necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of this chapter.”); NTIA Pet., supra note 106,
at 15–16.
138
47 U.S.C. § 201.
139
Id. § 201(a) (emphasis added).
140
Id. § 201(b) (emphasis added).
141
Id.
142
Chapter 5 of Title 47, titled “Wire or Radio Communication,” encompasses Sections 151 through
621 of Title 47. Section 230 is found in Subchapter II, titled “Common Carriers,” which includes Section
201 through 276.
143
NTIA Pet., supra note 106, at 16–17, 16 n.46.
137
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but the regulations in those cases at least concerned common carriers.144
Given that Section 201(b) appears to be focused on common carrier
regulations, its rulemaking authority grant seems a poor vehicle to use for
regulating entities that are not common carriers. And, as discussed further
below, there is no mandate for the FCC to “carry out” Section 230.
D. The FCC’s Lack of Rulemaking Authority Under Section 230
Notwithstanding the arguments above, Section 230 of the CDA is an
unlikely candidate for regulation by the FCC. Section 230 does not once
mention the FCC: It does not give the agency express authority to make rules,
nor does it create a scheme for the FCC to administer. Instead, the statute’s
immunities provide a defense to litigation.
In addition, Section 230(b)’s statements of policy are at odds with
regulation of content-related practices. Section 230(b)(2) speaks of
Congress’s desire to maintain the free and open market for Internet services
“unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”145 As Representative Christopher
Cox, one of Section 230’s co-sponsors put it, this statement of policy
establishes that “we do not wish to have content regulation by the Federal
Government of what is on the Internet [and] that we do not wish to have a
Federal Computer Commission with an army of bureaucrats regulating the
Internet.”146 Co-sponsor and then-Representative Ron Wyden observed that
Congress had rejected alternative proposals involving FCC oversight, which
he critiqued as requiring “the Federal Government spending vast sums of
money trying to define elusive terms that are going to lead to a flood of legal
challenges.”147 In response to NTIA’s petition, Senator Wyden and former
Representative Cox confirmed that “[w]e and our colleagues in Congress on
both sides of the aisle were emphatic that we were not creating new
regulatory authority for the FCC or any other independent agency or
executive branch department when we enacted Section 230.”148

144
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 378 n.5 (1999) (involving local competition
provisions affecting incumbent local exchange carriers under 47 U.S.C. §§ 251 and 252); City of
Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 294 (2013) (involving state regulation of siting applications for personal
wireless services, a type of common carrier, under 47 U.S.C. § 332).
145
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).
146
141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
147
Id. (statement of Rep. Wyden).
148
Co-Authors of Section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934, Reply Comments to Petition for
Rulemaking to Clarify Provision of Section 230, RM-11862, at 4 (Sept. 17, 2020),
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10917190303687/2020-09-17%20Cox-Wyden%20FCC%20Reply%20
Comments%20Final%20as%20Filed.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW6C-S5TB].
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Consistent with these views, the FCC has found that Section 230(b) sets
forth a “deregulatory policy”149 and cited it when determining not to classify
ISPs as telecommunications carriers and impose common carrier regulations
upon them.150 It would be ironic if the FCC then held that it somehow retained
the right to impose content removal regulations on websites, users, and ISPs
under Section 230(c).
Finally, any interpretation of Section 230 by the FCC would be an
exercise in futility because the FCC cannot actually enforce Section 230’s
immunities. Because Section 230 is a litigation defense, its arbiters are the
courts. While courts typically defer to agencies in the interpretation of their
governing statutes,151 they may not be so willing to do so here where the FCC
does not administer Section 230 and has no agency expertise or experience
adjudicating Section 230 cases.152 In addition, as explained in Part III, the
proposed rules are fundamentally inconsistent with Section 230.
III. THE PROPOSED RULES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH SECTION 230
Rulemaking authority is vested in agencies to fill in the gaps left by
Congress in a statute.153 Rulemaking cannot, however, be used to alter an
unambiguous statute.154 Even where ambiguity exists, an agency cannot
promulgate rules that unreasonably interpret the ambiguity155 or contravene
the text of the statute.156 Here, even assuming the FCC had proper authority,
the proposed changes would amend Section 230 without Congress’s consent.
A. The Proposed Limitation of Section 230(c)(1)
The Executive Order would have the FCC “clarify” that Section
230(c)(2)’s “good faith” requirement exclusively covers content removal
decisions. The problem, as the White House sees it, is that if Section
230(c)(1) also applies to content removals, then a service provider can
149

2018 FCC Order, supra note 129, at 349–50 ¶ 61.
Id.
151
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (explaining
that where a “statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute”); City of Arlington v.
FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 301–02 (2013) (holding that Chevron applies to both jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional matters).
152
See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (explaining that no deference is owed to IRS,
“which has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy”); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258–69
(2006) (finding no deference owed to DOJ where it lacked authority to issue interpretation).
153
See Nat’l Cable & Telecom. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005).
154
See id. at 986.
155
United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 493 n.1 (2012) (“It does not
matter whether the word ‘yellow’ is ambiguous when the agency has interpreted it to mean ‘purple.’”).
156
Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 634–35, 665–66 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
150
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remove content for any reason—whether or not taken in “good faith.”157 If
true, then a service provider’s ability to remove content is not constrained.
The Executive Order argues that this renders Section 230(c)(2) useless, and
that the canon against surplusage interpretations counsels an interpretation
that gives both provisions meaning.158 Accordingly, the Order argues that
Section 230(c)(1) should be limited to immunizing the act of making content
public, but not the act of removing or restricting access to content.159
The trouble with this surplusage argument is that it is not true.
Interpreting Section 230(c)(1) to apply to the decision to remove content
does not negate Section 230(c)(2). Instead, the latter “still has work to do.”160
First, Section 230(c)(1) applies only to publishing decisions made regarding
“information provided by another information content provider”—in other
words, third-party content.161 By its terms, this provision would not
immunize a website provider’s removal or restriction of its own content. In
contrast, Section 230(c)(2) would cover removal of the provider’s own
content as well as third party content, as it applies to any “materials”
regardless of the author.162 This immunity could come into play if a website
had decided to restrict portions of its content to some users, but not others
based upon, for example, the age of the users in question.163
Second, because Section 230(c)(1) requires that the defendant be
treated as the “publisher,” it does not apply where the service provider has
stepped outside of the traditional publisher role.164 For example, in Barnes v.
Yahoo!, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that a promise to remove content could
support a promissory estoppel claim that was not barred by Section 230(c)(1)
because it did not implicate the website’s duties as a publisher.165 Thus,
where a website makes an express promise regarding user content that is
collateral to its publisher role, Section 230(c)(1) might not apply; however,
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See supra notes 5–10 and accompanying text.
Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079, 34,081 (June 2, 2020).
159
Id.; see also e-Ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-646, 2017 WL 2210029,
at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017).
160
Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 969, 971 (2019) (in different statutory context, declining to apply
canon regarding surplusage interpretations).
161
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
162
See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009).
163
See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 563, 582 n.14 (2002) (recognizing existence of “adult
identification screens” to verify age of users); PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227, 252 (4th Cir. 2004)
(Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that “technological mechanisms exist to create adult zones by using
credit cards, passwords, PIN identification, adult verification services, and website self-identification
methods”).
164
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
165
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102, 1109.
158
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Section 230(c)(2) could still apply if the underlying action is to remove
content.
Third, Section 230(c)(2) actually contains two subparts. The second
subpart, paragraph (B), is not impacted by construing Section 230(c)(1) to
include or exclude content removal. Section 230(c)(2)(B) allows entities to
create and distribute tools that allow users and service providers to restrict
access to content as permitted by paragraph (A).166 Thus, Facebook or Twitter
may, without liability, enable users to block other people, and other
companies may create software that allows people to filter the content that
they view.167 The right in Section 230(c)(2)(B) incorporates by reference the
definitional elements of Section 230(c)(2)(A) and has no parallel in Section
230(c)(1).168
Considering all of the ways that Section 230(c)(2) may apply where
Section 230(c)(1) may not, the judicial preference of avoiding surplusage
interpretations does not apply.169
B. The Proposed Restriction of Section 230(c)(2)
NTIA’s petition restricts Section 230(c)(2) to the expressly enumerated
categories of content and then defines those categories narrowly.170 In doing
so, the petition reads the term “otherwise objectionable” out of the statute.171
NTIA relies on the statutory interpretation canon esjudem generis172 to
interpret that term but ends up actually eliminating it entirely.173 This is not
a reasonable construction since it fails to give meaning to the words
“otherwise objectionable,” thus committing the sin of surplusage
interpretations that the petition rails about elsewhere.174 In addition, as
discussed above, the force of esjudem generis is blunted where the
enumerated terms speak to vastly different matters, as is the case in the types
of material described in Section 230(c)(2)(A).175

166

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B).
See Fehrenbach v. Zeldin, No. 17-CV-5282, 2018 WL 4242452, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2018)
(dismissing claim that Facebook facilitated content removal by others).
168
Compare 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), with id. § 230(c)(2)(B).
169
See Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 969 (2019) (rejecting application of canon against
surplusage where statute “still has work to do”).
170
NTIA Pet., supra note 106, at 54–55 (proposed rules 47 C.F.R. §§ 130.02, 130.03).
171
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
172
NTIA Pet., supra note 106, at 31–32.
173
Id. at 54 (proposed rule 47 U.S.C. § 130.02(e)(vi)) (requiring “objectively reasonable belief that
the material falls within one of the listed categories set forth in 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A)”).
174
See id. at 28–29.
175
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (enumerating “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable” material).
167
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C. The Proposed Introduction of an Objective Standard
As written, Section 230(c)(2) protects a service provider that acts in
“good faith” to remove content that it “considers to be . . . objectionable.”176
This speaks to a purely subjective good faith standard.177 Despite this, NTIA
proposes to change the mental state to one of reasonableness. But because
terms like “good faith” and “reasonableness” have well-settled meanings
under the common law, it is presumed that, unless Congress specifically
provides otherwise, statutes should be interpreted with those standards in
mind.178 Since Congress did not provide a non-standard definition of “good
faith” (or any definition for that matter), it must be assumed that the term
retains its ordinary common law meaning.
To that end, “courts interpreting other federal statutes have traditionally
interpreted ‘good faith’ to encompass a subjective standard.”179 As such, “the
objective reasonableness standard is distinct from the subjective good faith
standard, and . . . Congress understands this distinction.”180 Because the two
standards are mutually exclusive,181 swapping one for the other would be akin
to rewriting the statute.
D. The Proposed Due Process Requirements
The Executive Order proposes that immunity should not apply to those
service providers who, in removing content, “fail[] to provide adequate
notice, reasoned explanation, or a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”182
NTIA’s petition recasts this burden by requiring service providers to (1)
furnish “timely notice” (2) “describ[e] with particularity the interactive
computer service’s reasonable factual basis for the restriction of access,” and
(3) provide users with “a meaningful opportunity to respond.”183 Advance
notice is not required, however, if “the interactive computer service has an
objectively reasonable belief that the content is related to criminal activity or

176

Id.
See Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 592, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (focusing on Vimeo’s
“subjective” good faith).
178
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999) (“It is a well-established rule of construction that
where Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under the common law, a court must
infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning
of these terms.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
179
Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)’s reference to “good faith belief” referred to subjective good faith).
180
Id.
181
See Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 925 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“These two
standards—one subjective and the other objective—cannot co-exist.”).
182
Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079, 34,081 (June 2, 2020).
183
NTIA Pet., supra note 106, at 55 (proposed rule 47 C.F.R. 130.02(e)(viii)).
177
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such notice would risk imminent physical harm to others.”184 It is difficult to
see how these procedural rules can be fashioned from thread as bare as “good
faith,” especially given Congress’s policy goals in enacting Section 230.185
As explained above, “good faith” is a subjective mental element. And, as
Professor David Pozen observes, “[c]lassic formulations of legal bad faith
look to the actor’s state of mind and, above all, to her honesty and
sincerity.”186 It does not, however, require procedural due process.187
Moreover, the statute is quite clear in what it requires of service
providers—and that is very little. The only affirmative obligation in the
entire statute is Section 230(d)’s unenforceable requirement that service
providers inform users that filtering technologies are available.188 The
existence of this singular obligation indicates that Congress knew how to
impose affirmative obligations on service providers, but declined to do so
when it came to content moderation.189 Consistent with this view, the
immunity applies “even when self-regulation is unsuccessful, or completely
unattempted.”190
In addition to these statutory interpretation hurdles, the notice
requirements create another concern that bears mentioning in brief.
Specifically, they raise the specter of compelled speech in violation of the
First Amendment. By requiring service providers to provide notice and to
articulate reasons for a proposed removal of content—as well the
requirement that they continue hosting objectionable content for a period
after notice has been delivered—the rules may very well abridge the First
Amendment right not to speak.191
184

Id.
See discussion infra Section IV.
186
David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 892 (2016).
187
For example, many judicial and governmental bodies make decisions every day without providing
reasons. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 634 (1995) (providing examples
including the Supreme Court denying certiorari, appellate judges ruling from the bench, and trial judges
overruling objections).
188
47 U.S.C. § 230(d). Congress did not provide in the statute a remedy for violation thereof. Id.
189
Here, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (to say one thing is to exclude another)
comes into play. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 188 (1978) (holding that Congress’s
decision to include hardship exemptions in a statute indicated the lack of additional non-hardship-based
exemptions).
190
See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 523 (Cal. 2006) (discussing lack of obligations under
Section 230(c)(1)); Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that
“Section 230(c)(2) does not require AOL to restrict speech; rather it allows AOL to establish standards
of decency without risking liability for doing so”).
191
A full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Essay. For a general discussion of the
First Amendment right against compelled speech, see Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right
Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 977–80 (2009). Certain commenters in the FCC
185
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IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
While some believe that voluntary measures by large social media
platforms to enhance content moderation transparency and provide recourse
mechanisms are welcome,192 the Section 230 immunities should not be
conditioned upon providing such measures. Congress explicitly endorsed
this policy choice in enacting Section 230.193 Indeed, one court concluded
that requiring a service provider to discuss its reasons for removing content
would be inconsistent with these goals.194 Congress usually does not “hide
elephants in mouseholes,”195 and so it would be surprising if Congress sought
to undermine its own goals through an idiosyncratic conception of “good
faith.”
Moreover, moderating content is a complex endeavor, particularly for
companies that are operating at scale, and prescriptive content moderation
rules would likely cause unintended harms, such as increasing moderation
challenges, enabling more harmful speech online, and rendering the
immunity provided by Section 230(c)(2) essentially nonexistent.
A. Increased Moderation Challenges
Requiring advance notice or individualized reasons for content removal
will make moderation efforts less effective and more costly. First, these
duties cannot fully be performed by automated technologies, which major
platforms use, in conjunction with human review, to address the sheer
volume of content posted by users.196 Automated techniques include using

proceeding have raised the point about compelled speech. See, e.g., TechFreedom, Comments on Petition
for Rulemaking to Clarify Provisions of Section 230, RM-11862, at 71–73 (Sept. 2, 2020),
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10903920204512/NTIA%20230%20Petition%20Comments%20%209.2.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y72Z-HVCQ]; Professors Christopher Terry and Daniel Lyons,
Reply Comments on Petition for Rulemaking to Clarify Provisions of Section 230, RM-11862, at 3–4
(Sept. 10, 2020), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/109101724016162/2020%20Terry%20and%20Lyons
%20Sec%20230%20Comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/LX3F-KUCM].
192
For example, the Santa Clara Principles on user content set forth voluntary principles for content
moderation transparency and recourse. See THE SANTA CLARA PRINCIPLES ON TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN CONTENT MODERATION, https://santaclaraprinciples.org/ [https://perma.cc/6K3YQMEQ].
193
See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
194
See Holomaxx Tech. v. Microsoft Corp., 783 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding
that imposing “a duty [on Microsoft] to discuss in detail its reasons for blocking Holomaxx’s
communications or to provide a remedy for such blocking . . . would be inconsistent with the intent of
Congress”).
195
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
196
Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 60 (2d Cir. 2019) (describing Facebook’s efforts to combat
extremist content on its platform through the combination of internal procedures, user reports, and
experimental artificial intelligence).
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keywords to block or identify content,197 filtering suspect IP addresses,198
detecting suspicious activity traffic patterns,199 fingerprinting media files and
comparing them to reference databases, and hash-blocking files.200 These
tools are particularly useful when combatting problems of scale like spam
and inauthentic content, which can be automated by bad actors. If these tools
cannot be used, spam and inauthentic content will proliferate.
Platforms could try to compensate by increasing the size of their human
review teams, but this comes with additional costs and challenges. As
Professor Tim Wu has observed, software-based solutions enjoy an
“undeniable comparative advantage” over human employees when it comes
to “scale, speed, and efficacy.”201 Human review is particularly ill-suited to
problems caused by automated software like scripts or bots—the tools of
choice for spammers, hackers, and other bad actors.202 While human review
is an acceptable (and perhaps even the preferred203) method for reviewing
197
See Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 500, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing
keyword-based tools), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016).
198
See Optinrealbig.com, LLC v. Ironport Sys., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1040–41 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (describing use of IP addresses to combat spam).
199
See Kurt Wagner, Facebook Found a New Way to Identify Spam and False News Articles in Your
News Feed (June 30, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/2017/6/30/15896544/facebook-fake-newsfeed-algorithm-update-spam [https://perma.cc/5FN5-QW6L] (explaining that Facebook algorithms
determine fake news in part by examining links shared by persons posting content more than fifty times
per day).
200
Klonick, supra note 11, at 1636–37 (describing “ex ante,” i.e., pre-publication, automated
moderation methods).
201
Tim Wu, Will Artificial Intelligence Eat the Law? The Rise of Hybrid Social-Ordering Systems,
119 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2021 (2019) (“Code is fast, can scale to meet the size of the problem, and
operates at low marginal cost.”).
202
What is a Spam Bot? How Spam Comments and Spam Messages Spread, CLOUDFLARE,
https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/bots/what-is-a-spambot/#:~:text=%7C%20How%20Spam%20
Comments%20and%20Spam,operate%20stolen%20social%20media%20accounts [https://perma.cc/6D
B2-53W3]; see also Recent Development, Splog! Or How to Stop the Rise of a New Menace on the
Internet, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 467, 469–70, 476 (2006) (describing the proliferation of link and
comment spam caused by automated software and calling for regulation of the use of scripts, bots, and
other programs to quickly post multiple messages on these sites).
203
Automated technologies may be more efficient, but they may miss nuances and may lead to either
(or both) an over-removal of lawful content (false positives) or an under-removal of illicit content (false
negatives). See Michal Lavi, Do Platforms Kill?, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 499–500 (2020)
(“[T]hus far, technological suggestions for moderation of terrorist content have been rejected. There is
concern that algorithms will fail to capture context accurately, resulting in both over-removal of content
that is not incitement . . . and under-removal of inciting content that would allow harmful content to
spread.”). In addition, “data-driven, algorithmic processes multiply both obstacles to accountability and
opportunities for cooptation of accountability structures.” Julie E. Cohen, Internet Utopianism and the
Practical Inevitability of the Law, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 85, 95 (2019). As a result of these
drawbacks, “[h]uman resources remain vitally important to when and how the major platforms publicly
distribute user-generated content.” Olivier Sylvain, Recovering Tech’s Humanity, 119 COLUM. L. REV.
F. 252, 260 (2019).
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certain types of content on an individualized basis, it is not well suited to
situations where a bad actor is flooding a site with thousands of posts in a
very short time period. This scenario presents a problem of scale that is best
addressed by technical solutions to, among other things, detect and block
suspicious traffic patterns.204 In addition, not every platform has the resources
to hire a team of thousands.
At the same time, human review productivity will likely decrease as
reviewers would be forced to provide detailed reasons when removing
content. At present, most sites provide only the nature of the violation (e.g.,
“pornography”). Such a response would, presumably, not suffice under the
proposed rules, where the service provider must issue a written notice
“describing with particularity” the “factual basis” for its decision.205 Taking
the time to, for example, watch the entirety of a video, and then detail the
reasons for removal (e.g., “At time index 2:30, the individuals in the video
participate in a sexual act, to wit . . . .”) will almost certainly slow down
content removals and limit the number of removals that each human reviewer
can accomplish within a workday.206
Furthermore, platforms that rely on volunteer moderators to achieve
scale will suffer. Section 230 currently protects every volunteer moderator
of a forum when they remove content. At present, individual employees who
make decisions about user content are covered by Section 230 since they
themselves are “users” of interactive computer services.207 If the Order’s
suggested rules apply, however, unpaid volunteers who serve as moderators
of interest-based forums208 could be exposed to personal liability. This makes

204
Jonathan I. Ezor, Busting Blocks: Revisiting 47 U.S.C. § 230 to Address the Lack of Effective
Legal Recourse for Wrongful Inclusion in Spam Filters, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 14–18 (2011)
(describing technologies including block lists and filters for addressing email spam).
205
NTIA Pet., supra note 106, at 55 (proposed rule 47 C.F.R. 130.02(e)(viii)).
206
There is also a cost exacted on the human reviewers. In May 2020, Facebook agreed to provide a
settlement fund of $52 million to former content moderators who suffered post-traumatic stress disorder
as a result of their work reviewing graphic and objectionable content in connection with a putative class
action lawsuit. See SCOLA V. FACEBOOK PROPOSED SETTLEMENT, https://contentmoderator
settlement.com/ [https://perma.cc/6BU3-W3J4] (official settlement website for Scola v. Facebook, Inc.,
No. 18-civ-05135 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2019)). Final approval of the settlement is pending.
207
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1), (c)(2)(A); see also, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th
Cir. 2003) (“[T]he language of § 230(c)(1) confers immunity not just on ‘providers’ of such services, but
also on ‘users’ of such services.”).
208
See J. Nathan Matias, What Just Happened on Reddit? Understanding the Moderator Blackout,
SOC. MEDIA COLLECTIVE (July 13, 2015), https://socialmediacollective.org/2015/07/09/what-justhappened-on-reddit-understanding-the-moderator-blackout/ [https://perma.cc/XS77-BZQT] (estimating
that nearly 100,000 people volunteer as moderators of online communities on Reddit known as
“subreddits”).
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a difficult and uncompensated job209 even less attractive. Without a willing
pool of moderators, websites will have to choose between devoting more
resources to content moderation or deciding to forego content moderation
altogether.
Faced with increased costs, some companies will decide that the
benefits of hosting user feedback are outweighed by the cost of having to
moderate it and will opt to shut it down. This will be particularly true where
user content is an ancillary feature of a company’s website. For example,
local newspapers, already struggling to stay in business, might cut off “below
the line” comments sections on their stories.210 Similarly, online retailers and
aggregators may stop allowing user reviews.211
Well-funded social media platforms will likely invest in more people,
but new entrants do not have this luxury.212 And given that there is little
evidence that consumers want less moderation in their social media
platforms, startups will suffer to gain traction.213 Social media as a sector
could therefore become less attractive to investment.214 This will reduce
competition, thus entrenching the very “titans” the Executive Order
decries.215
B. More Harmful Speech Online
Under the Executive Order and NTIA’s proposed regulations, the
immunity for content removal would be limited to the categories of harmful
content expressly enumerated in the statute. This means that service
providers will only be protected from civil liability when they remove (1)
209
See Robert Peck, The Punishing Ecstasy of Being a Reddit Moderator, WIRED (Mar. 21, 2019,
6:00
AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/the-punishing-ecstasy-of-being-a-reddit-moderator/
[https://perma.cc/CCA2-3RNQ] (describing challenges of being a volunteer moderator).
210
See Clothilde Goujard, Why News Websites Are Closing Their Comments Sections, MEDIUM
(Sept. 8, 2016), https://medium.com/global-editors-network/why-news-websites-are-closing-theircomments-sections-ea31139c469d [https://perma.cc/Q9EG-4GLJ].
211
Even product reviews can contain speech that expresses social and political viewpoints. See
Andrew Adam Newman, Playmobil Finds Fun in the Police State, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/16/business/media/16playmobil.html [https://perma.cc/C77S-E7KG]
(describing reviews on Amazon.com of toy airport security playset in which users commented on the
security state and racial profiling).
212
See Goldman, supra note 33, at 8 (“If new entrants had to develop industrial-grade content
moderation procedures from day one, we’d see far fewer new entrants.”).
213
See Tim Miller & Hannah Yoest, The Gross Hellscape that Awaits Ted Cruz on Parler, BULWARK
(June 26, 2020), https://thebulwark.com/the-gross-hellscape-that-awaits-ted-cruz-on-parler/ [https://per
ma.cc/B9LU-VLNA].
214
Uncertainty about copyright infringement in the late 1990s caused a “localized investment
drought . . . amidst the general dot-com deluge.” STEPHEN WITT, HOW MUSIC GOT FREE: A STORY OF
OBSESSION AND INVENTION 121 (2015).
215
Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079, 34,080 (June 2, 2020).
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pornography and other adult-related materials, (2) excessively violent
content, and (3) harassing speech. This leaves a world of harmful content
online: Hate speech, fake news, and even defamation—which animated
Section 230—would no longer be covered. Without protections, some
companies may choose not to expand categories of prohibited content or to
vigorously enforce unprotected categories. This risks a proliferation of
harmful content on Internet platforms.
Hate speech presents a particular problem and is a glaring (and perhaps
telling) omission from the Executive Order and NTIA’s petition. The very
purpose and effect of hate speech is to diminish speech and public
participation by targeted groups.216 As Steve Huffman, Reddit’s CEO and
Co-Founder, recently stated, “[t]here’s certain speech—for example,
harassment and hate—that prevents other people from speaking.”217 Notably,
one Trump-appointed judge echoed Huffman’s concern in voting to allow
President Trump to block users in his Twitter feed because having a forum
“overrun with harassment, trolling, and hate speech” will lead to less speech,
not more.218
Misinformation, another category noticeably left unprotected, would
also likely proliferate. As with hate speech, misinformation can cause real
world harms. Incorrect medical advice can be fatal, while voting
misinformation can undermine democracy. The reply that “more speech” is
the best way to counteract these harms is unsatisfactory. Content like fake
news propagates far more rapidly and widely than truthful information and
is thus impervious to counterspeech.219
And even where Section 230(c)(2) would continue to apply, the
proposed rules would require service providers to keep certain types of
content online until the posting user has a reasonable opportunity to respond,
thus further increasing the moderation challenges described above. While the
rules provide an exception for cases where the provider reasonably believes
that the content violates criminal law, this would not address many common

216

Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital
Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1147–50 (2011).
217
Kevin Roose, Reddit’s C.E.O. on Why He Banned ‘The_Donald’ Subreddit, N.Y. TIMES (June
30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/30/us/politics/reddit-bans-steve-huffman.html?action
=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage [https://perma.cc/JX88-B7XN].
218
Knight First Am. Inst. v. Trump, 953 F.3d 216, 231 (2d Cir. 2019) (Park, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
219
Caroline Mala Corbin, The Unconstitutionality of Government Propaganda, OHIO STATE L. REV.,
(forthcoming
2020)
(manuscript
at
29–30),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3552222 [https://perma.cc/46RQ-VHKW] (explaining that truthful statements
are far less likely to be retweeted than lies).
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types of harmful content.220 Take pornography for example. In the United
States, content depicting sexual acts—i.e., pornography—is legal. As a
result, to earn protection under Section 230(c)(2), service providers would
have to give posting users notice and an opportunity to respond before they
could remove or even restrict access to pornographic content. In the
meantime, the provider will be displaying this content to an audience that
may include children.
Perhaps even worse than pornography are forms of harassment. While
extreme cases of harassment can be illegal, mere acts of trolling and insults
are not. Such toxic content harms the civil discourse by making people less
likely to participate in the first place. What is more, “the burdens of dealing
with the production of incendiary speech in social media are not borne
equally: such speech appears to disproportionately target women and people
of color, especially those who use social media platforms to speak up against
perceived injustice.”221 By delaying the removal of harassing content, the
Order allows harassers to win.
C. An Illusory Immunity
As a practical matter, even where Section 230(c)(2) applies, if the
Executive Order were to have full sway, the degree of immunity provided
would be minimal, at best. Whereas the assertion of today’s version requires
only a showing of subjective good faith, the President’s version requires that
a defendant satisfy a whole panoply of affirmative requirements.222 The
existence of so many requirements makes it unlikely that the affirmative
defense could be won on a motion to dismiss. For example, imagine a case
where a plaintiff sues, claiming that the defendant has wrongfully removed
his videos. He is not obligated to anticipate Section 230 and provide facts
relating to the service provider’s actions,223 so he merely alleges that the
service provider has acted wrongfully. In most courts, the defendant likely
220

See discussion supra Section III.D.
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Linda Riedemann Norbut, #I [Hate] U: Considering the Context of
Online Threats, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1885, 1905–06 (2018); see also, e.g., Tiara Quintana, What’s in a
“Like”?: The Union Interest in Regulating Social Media Use, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 147, 152 (2017)
(“[T]rolling, hate speech, and online harassment disparately impact women, as a study from 2000–2012
reported that 72.5% of online harassment targeted females.”); Thaddeus Houston, Constitutional Drag
Race: Anonymous Online Speech After Digital Music News v. Superior Court, 30 BERK. TECH. L. J. 1243,
1247 (2015) (“Pseudonymous trolls also have persistent and troubling misogynistic tendencies.”); id. at
1248 (“Another more recent example is ‘Gamergate,’ where female members of the video-gaming
community have suffered unjustified real-world consequences for speaking out on the role of women in
the video game industry, beginning with waves of attacks by pseudonymous trolls.”).
222
See discussion supra Section III.C.
223
See Flying Food Grp., Inc. v. NLRB, 471 F.3d 178, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[A] plaintiff is not
required to negate an affirmative defense in his complaint.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
221
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will not be able to, in an early motion, introduce facts showing that it
provided notice and reasons.224 The case must then proceed to discovery,
which can be costly, and a trial, unless the court grants summary judgment.
All of this changes the cost equation for the service provider. No longer does
Section 230 provide an immunity at relatively low cost; instead, it provides
an immunity that can only be achieved after substantial (and costly)
litigation. Faced with the prospect of costly litigation, service providers may
well take the path of least resistance: decline to remove content in close cases
or cases where the user strenuously objects and threats a lawsuit. The result
is more harmful speech online.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to the White House’s belief, the FCC cannot modify Section
230 in the guise of interpreting it. The FCC lacks broad authority to regulate
the Internet and has closed off possible avenues of regulatory authority in the
net neutrality proceedings. In addition, the rules proposed by the Executive
Order are inconsistent with Section 230’s plain text and purpose. Finally, the
Order’s proposed rules requiring due process would create uncertainty where
none exists now, make hosting user speech more costly, and burden efforts
to remove harmful content. This will lead to less beneficial speech, not more.

224
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (providing that “if . . . matters outside the pleadings are presented to and
not excluded by the court, the motion [to dismiss] must be treated as one for summary judgment” and that
“[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the
motion”).
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